

# Omar Bamieh

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## CONTACT INFORMATION

Via delle Fontanelle 18  
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## PERSONAL

Date of birth: 1985  
Nationality: Italian

## RESEARCH INTERESTS

Labor Economics, Personnel Economics, Law and Economics, Applied Microeconometrics

## EMPLOYMENT

### University of Vienna, Department of Economics

- Assistant Professor of Economics Starting September 2017

### Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies

- Research Associate February 2017 – August 2017

## EDUCATION

### European University Institute (Florence, Italy)

- Ph.D. Candidate, Economics September 2012 – September 2017 (expected)  
Advisors: Andrea Ichino and Andrea Mattozzi
- M.Res in Economics 2012 – 2013

### Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)

- M.S. Economics, *Summa Cum Laude* 2009 – 2012
- B.S. Economics 2006 – 2009

## PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

### European University Institute (Florence, Italy)

- Research assistant to Prof. Andrea Mattozzi. September, 2015 – February, 2016  
Cleaning and organization of survey data on the careers of Italian politicians.
- Editorial assistant to Prof. Andrea Ichino for *Economic Policy*. September, 2015 – ongoing

### Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (MA, USA) May 2010 – September 2010

- Research assistant to Prof. Munther Dahleh and Prof. Alireza Tahbaz-Salehi, project on the applications of Global Games to the value of public information.

### Bocconi University (Milan, Italy)

February, 2009 – June 2009

- Research assistant to Prof. Debrah Meloso, project on applications of Mechanism Design to Microfinance.

RESEARCH PAPERS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Omar Bamieh. Firing Costs and Employment Inaction. Evidence from Randomly-Assigned Judges. <b>Job Market Paper</b>.</li> <li>● Omar Bamieh. The Adverse Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Tournaments. Empirical Evidence from The German Bundesliga.</li> <li>● Omar Bamieh. Are Lawyers responsible for Trials' Delay?</li> </ul>	
RESEARCH PAPERS IN PROGRESS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Omar Bamieh and Matthias Sutter. The motivation effect of scoring the last goal before extra time. Evidence from major European Football Cups.</li> <li>● Omar Bamieh and Antoni-Italo de Moragas. Do Higher Tuition Fees Increase Studying Effort? Evidence from Tuition Fees Exemptions.</li> </ul>	
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	<p><b>European University Institute</b> (Florence, Italy)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Teaching assistant to Andrea Ichino for the advanced course of the Economics PhD program "The Problem of Causality in Microeconometrics"</li> </ul>	Spring 2015
SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES, (*FORTHCOMING)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● RIDGE-Workshop on Public Economics 2017, Montevideo.*</li> <li>● Job talks: SOFI (Stockholm University); University of Vienna; CUNEF (Madrid); University of Konstanz; Stockholm School of Economics; Lund University.</li> <li>● Invited talk at the Research Seminar in Applied Microeconomics, University of Cologne, December 2016.</li> <li>● 4th CIDE Workshop for PhD students in Econometrics and Empirical Economics, Bank of Italy-SADiBa, (Perugia), 2016.</li> <li>● 2nd Annual Conference of the International Association for Applied Econometrics (IAAE), (Thessaloniki), 2015.</li> <li>● 6th Italian Congress of Econometrics and Empirical Economics (ICEEE), (Salerno), paper shortlisted for best conference paper, 2015.</li> <li>● EUI Microeconometrics Working Group (Florence), 2014-2015.</li> </ul>	
REFEREING	<i>Economic Policy, Labour Economics</i>	
HONORS AND AWARDS	Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ph.D. Grant.	2012-2016
COMPUTER SKILLS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Statistical Packages: Stata, R</li> <li>● Matlab</li> </ul>	
LANGUAGES	English(proficient), Italian(native), French(fluent).	

WORKING PAPERS **“Firing Costs and Employment Inaction. Evidence from Randomly–Assigned Judges”,  
(Job Market Paper)**

Using a quasi–experimental setting I test the effect of firing costs on firms hiring and firing decisions and I provide a theoretical interpretation of these causal estimates. Exogenous variation of expected firing costs is offered by the random allocation of judges to trials involving firms in a large Italian court. Judges may be slow or fast and therefore firms experience randomly assigned shorter or longer trial lengths in an institutional context in which longer trials imply higher employment protection. I find that a 1% increase in expected firing costs induced by the past experience of a longer trial reduces the hazard of hiring or firing by 0.4% after the end of the trial. The same variation generates a 0.3% increase of average employment levels. These effects are not due to the sunk costs induced by past trials since they do not depend on how much the firm is liquidity constrained. They are, instead, smaller in size for older firms that, given more experience, are less likely to revise their expectations.

**“The Adverse Incentive Effects of Heterogeneity in Tournaments, Empirical Evidence from The German Bundesliga”**

Tournaments may motivate workers to provide effort, yet differences in relative abilities may undermine the incentives of workers to exert effort. I use a novel data set from professional football competitions and find that differences in relative abilities are associated with lower effort exerted by players. In this empirical setting, effort and relative abilities are measured as, respectively, the distance covered on the pitch by football players and relative winning probabilities, the latter derived from betting odds of professional bookmakers. Assuming that betting odds control for all unobservable variables affecting at the same time relative abilities and effort, I find that larger differences in betting odds of opposing teams lead to less distance covered on the pitch.

**“Are Lawyers responsible for Trials’ Delay?”**

We study the role of lawyers in explaining the length of trials filed in a large Italian labor court between 2001–2012. To understand if lawyers affect the length of trials we estimate the contribution of unobservable time–invariant lawyers’ characteristics in explaining the variability of trials’ length. We find that 28% of the variance of the length of trials is explained by unobservable time–invariant lawyers’ characteristics. By controlling for the complexity of each controversy we can rule out that part of this effect is due to the fact that lawyers tend to specialize in certain types of controversies. Whether lawyers are partially responsible for the slow Italian judicial system is a hypothesis that has been often mentioned in the political debate, but this is the first paper that tries to find convincing evidence for it. In fact, Italian lawyers do not charge a flat fee but are paid for the hours worked on a client’s case until it is resolved. Moreover, Italian jurisdictions let lawyers adduce new evidence whenever they want, allowing them to prolong a case with a new submission. Therefore, Italian lawyers have both the incentives and the means to make money by delaying trials.

REFERENCES

**Prof. Andrea Ichino**(supervisor)  
European University Institute  
Department of Economics

**Prof. Andrea Mattozzi**  
European University Institute  
Department of Economics

**Prof. Juan J. Dolado**  
European University Institute  
Department of Economics

**Prof. Matthias Sutter**  
University of Cologne, Germany  
Chair in Economics: Behavior and Design