

## CURRICULUM VITAE – April 2017

SANTIAGO PEREZ VINCENT

### CONTACT INFORMATION

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Address: Department of Economics, Università Bocconi

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### PERSONAL INFORMATION

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Date of birth: (

Nationality: S

### EDUCATION

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**Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi**

PhD in Economics (in progress)

Advisor: Prof. Guido Tabellini

Milan, Italy

2013-Present

**Universidad de San Andrés (UdeSA)**

Magister (MA) in Economics

Buenos Aires, Argentina

2009-2012

**Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)**

Licenciatura (BA) in Economics

Buenos Aires, Argentina

2003-2008

### AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS

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**Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi**

PhD scholarship

Milan, Italy

2013-Present

**Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)**

Merit-based full tuition waiver scholarship

Gold medal (Highest GPA)

Buenos Aires, Argentina

2003-2008

### RESEARCH INTERESTS

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Microeconometrics, Political Economics, Development.

### WORKING PAPERS

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Ballot Access Regulations and Local Politics: Evidence from Italian Municipalities.

Paying Politicians: A Structural Approach.

## **PUBLICATIONS**

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Pérez Vincent, Santiago. (2013). Polarización política, rigideces presupuestarias e inflación [en línea], *Ensayos de Política Económica*, 1(7). Available at:  
<http://bibliotecadigital.uca.edu.ar/repositorio/revistas/polarizacion-politica-rigideces-presupuestarias.pdf>

## **RESEARCH IN PROGRESS**

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Learning Entrepreneurial Skills: Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial in Argentina (joint with D. Ubfal)  
Heterogeneous Time Preferences, Public Education Expenditures and Income Inequality.  
Roots of Prejudice: Lessons from Contemporary Africa (joint with Alexandros Fraga).

## **CONFERENCES AND WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS**

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### *Forthcoming Conferences*

European Economic Association Meeting, Lisbon, Portugal ( <i>poster session, paper accepted</i> )	August 2017
Institutions, Individual Behavior and Economic Outcomes, Alghero, Italy ( <i>paper accepted</i> )	June 2017

### *Past Conferences*

European Public Choice Society Annual Meeting, Budapest, Hungary	April 2017
Alberto Alesina Seminar, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy	June 2016
Economics PhD Workshop, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy	January 2016
Seminario de Economía, Universidad Católica Argentina, Buenos Aires, Argentina	March 2013
Reunión Anual de la Asociación Argentina de Economía Política, Trelew, Argentina	November 2012

## **TEACHING EXPERIENCE**

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<b>Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi</b>	Milan, Italy
Political Economics (Master). Professor: G. Tabellini. Teaching Assistant	Fall 2016-2017
Advanced Econometrics I (PhD). Professor: J. Adda. Teaching Assistant	Fall 2016-2017
Advanced Microeconomics III (PhD). Professor: M. Messner. Teaching Assistant	Spring 2016
Macroeconomics I (Undergraduate). Professor: T. Murphy. Teaching Assistant	Spring 2015-2017
History of Political Institutions (Undergraduate). Professor: T. Murphy. Teaching Assistant	Spring 2017
Microeconomics I (Undergraduate). Professor: N. Kos / D. Ubfal. Teaching Assistant	Fall 2015
<b>Universidad Católica Argentina (UCA)</b>	Buenos Aires, Argentina
Macroeconomic Analysis (Undergraduate). Professor: R. Arriazu. Adjunct Professor	2009-2012

## **WORK EXPERIENCE**

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<b>Estudio Arriazu &amp; Asociados</b>	Buenos Aires, Argentina
Economic consultancy firm advising domestic and multinational clients including Bank of America, McDonald's Latin America, Lazard and Duke Energy.	
Economist	2006-2013

## PROFESSIONAL MEMBERSHIPS

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European Economic Association (EEA)	2017 - Present
Econometric Society (ES)	2016 - Present
Royal Economic Society (RES)	2016 - Present

## LANGUAGE SKILLS

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Spanish: Native  
English: Full Professional Proficiency  
Italian: Limited Working Proficiency

## IT SKILLS

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Stata: Advanced  
MATLAB: Advanced  
Python: Intermediate  
QGIS: Intermediate

## REFERENCES

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**Prof. Guido Tabellini**  
guido.tabellini@unibocconi.it  
Department of Economics, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy

**Prof. Tommaso Nannicini**  
tommaso.nannicini@unibocconi.it  
Department of Economics, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy

**Prof. Massimo Morelli**  
massimo.morelli@unibocconi.it  
Department of Economics, Università Bocconi, Milan, Italy

Milan, April 2017  
Santiago Pérez Vincent

## RELEVANT PROJECTS - ABSTRACTS

### **Ballot Access Regulations and Local Politics: Evidence from Italian Municipalities.**

Ballot access regulations determine who can run for an elective office. Signature requirements (that is, asking potential candidates to collect a certain number of subscriptions among eligible voters) are among the most common types of these regulations. I examine the causal effect of signature requirements on different aspects of local politics: electoral competition, political participation, candidates' selection and governmental performance. I use data on Italian municipalities and apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD), exploiting that signature requirements are only present in municipalities of more than 1000 inhabitants. I find that asking citizens to collect subscriptions significantly reduces electoral competition (measured by the number of -non-marginal- candidates, winner's margin, winner's share, and number of unopposed races), reduces political participation, and leads to an older pool of candidates. I then exploit well-documented differences in social capital within Italy to assess if such effects are moderated by local cultural values (Putnam, 1993). I find that effects on political competition are sizable among high-social-capital cities, and small in low-social-capital ones. I provide a simple theoretical model relating campaigning costs, social capital and candidates' selection, which rationalizes these findings and provides further implications that are verified in the data: signature requirements have a positive effect in administrative efficiency among high-social-capital municipalities and a negative effect in low-social-capital ones. Results show the importance of institutional details on electoral outcomes, and contribute to make sense of the link between social capital and political institutions, highlighting the relevance of the local cultural environment in the functioning of institutions.

### **Paying Politicians: A Structural Approach.**

Culture and institutions are the key determinants of a society's capability to both select and discipline its politicians. In this paper, I focus on politicians' wages, with the aim of contributing to the understanding on how this specific feature of institutions affects citizens' decision to participate in politics, incumbents' behavior, and, ultimately, overall politicians' performance. To do so, I estimate the political agency model proposed by Aruoba, Drazen and Vlaicu (2015) using data on Italian municipalities. The main innovation of the project is to use a structural approach to address the relationship between politicians' remuneration and their performance. Relative to the existing empirical literature on the topic, this approach serves to better quantify and disentangle the different mechanisms at play, providing a stronger link to the theoretical literature and clearer policy implications. Results show that higher wages lead to a pool of more able but also more reelection-motivated politicians. Overall, better remunerations lead to better average performance. The effect is mainly driven by the change in candidates' skills, but it is also favored by an enhanced effect of elections, which allow to better discipline and screen out bad incumbents.

### **Political Polarization, Budget Rigidities and Inflation.**

(Original Title: Polarización política, rigideces presupuestarias e inflación)

Inflation performance differs substantially across countries. The characteristics of the political system are considered as important determinants of inflation outcome by economic literature. In particular, political instability and political polarization are associated with higher inflation rates and volatility. This paper provides an alternative explanation for this documented relationship. The paper shows that public budget rigidities (specially, downside nominal inflexibility in public expenses) combined with high political polarization can create incentives leading to higher inflation rates and higher inflation volatility.